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Article: 
What is conditional obligation and under what circumstances may an absolute obligation be 
detached from a conditional obligation? These questions have recently been much discussed. I 
think that a very plausible answer has been given to the first question but that the second 
question has not yet received a satisfactory answer. In this paper I shall attempt to remedy this 
deficiency, at least to some extent, by noting the intimate relation between conditional obligation 
and what I shall call subsidiary absolute obligation. 
 
Part I 
In order to discuss when detachment of an absolute obligation from a conditional obligation is 
warranted, an account must first be given of both absolute and conditional obligation. In order to 
do this, I propose first that we say, roughly, that a person can perform an action just in case there 
is some accessible world in which he does perform it. Or more precisely: 
 
(D1) Person S can at time T do action A at time T' in world W =df. 
(1) T' is not earlier than T; and 
(2) there is a world W', accessible to S from W at T, in which S does A at T'. 
 
I do not pretend that this definition itself constitutes a satisfactory analysis of "can", for the term 
"accessible" is purely a term of art whose meaning I have not tried, and shall not try, to clarify. 
What I do think is plausible is the claim that the "can" of action is, in principle, analyzable in 
terms of possible worlds — just as the "cans" of logical possibility, physical possibility, and so 
on, are — and that any such analysis must follow the form of (D1).
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Now, the point of giving (DO is that it introduces what I think is helpful talk of possible worlds 
— helpful, in that I take it that "ought (absolutely)" implies "can" and also that "ought 
(absolutely)" is analyzable in terms of 
possible worlds. (Of course, the contention that "ought" implies "can" is controversial. This is 
not the occasion to debate it.) In particular, I think that we may say, roughly, that S ought 
(absolutely) to do A just in case some accessible world in which he does A is more valuable than 
any accessible world in which he does not do A; and that we may say, roughly, that S ought to do 
A if p is true just in case some accessible p-world in which he does A is more valuable than any 
accessible p-world in which he does not do A. Or more precisely: 
 
(D2) S ought (absolutely) at T to do A at T' in W =df. 
(1) T' is not earlier than T; and 
(2) there is a world W' such that: 
(a) W’ is accessible to S from W at T and S does A at T' in W'; 
(b) there is a world W" such that W" is accessible to S from W at T and S does 
not do A at T' in W"; and 
(c) for all worlds W" such that W" is accessible to S from W at T and S does not 
do A at T' in W", the value of W' is greater than the value of W". 
 
(D3) S ought at T to do A at T' in W, on the condition that p is true =df. 
(1) T' is not earlier than T; and 
(2) there is a world W' such that: 
(a) W' is accessible to S from W at T and S does A at T' in W' and p is true in W1; 
(b) there is a world W" such that W" is accessible to S from W at T and S does 
not do A at T1 in W" and p is true in W"; and 
(c) for all worlds W" such that W" is accessible to S from W at T and S does not 
do A at T' in W" and p is true in W", the value of W' is greater than the value of 
W". 
 
These analyses are not novel. On the contrary, something like (D3) is suggested by Michael 
McKinsey
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 and both (D2) and (D3) follow very closely analyses provided by Fred Feldman.
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(D2) and (D3) have a lot going for them. They are intuitively very plausible; taken together, they 
demonstrate a clear kinship between absolute and conditional obligation; but also, taken together, 
they have the desired implication that an obligation to do A on the condition that p is true, 
combined with the fact that p is true, does not automatically yield an absolute obligation to do A. 
Such unrestricted detachment is blocked, and properly so. Suppose that Smith can at T1 either 
attend a meeting on the first floor of his building at T2, or attend a meeting on the second floor of 
his building at T2, but not both. Suppose also that he ought (absolutely) at T1 to attend the 
meeting on the first floor at T2, but also that he ought at T1 to attend the meeting on the second 
floor at T2 if he does not attend the meeting on the first floor at T2. Suppose, finally, that Smith, 
out of sheer will not attend the meeting on the first floor at T2. It hardly follows that Smith ought 
at T1 to attend the meeting on the second floor at T2. Such detachment of an absolute obligation 
would be objectionable for at least two reasons. First, it would allow there to be two absolute 
obligations, at most one of which can be satisfied. While some seem to accept the possibility of 
such a conflict of obligations, I do not; and, at any rate, it should not be so easy to generate such 
conflict.
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 Second — a related point — it gives the irresponsible agent far too easy an excuse: "I 
can't satisfy both obligations; one is just as much of an obligation as the other; so I'll take my 
pick and satisfy the second". 
 
But while such unrestricted detachment of an absolute obligation from a conditional obligation is 
not warranted, it has seemed to many that detachment is sometimes warranted. And, of course, 
this is true. Both Feldman and Patricia Greenspan have noted the following: if S ought at T to do 
A at T' on the condition that p is true, and if S cannot at T so act that p is false, then S ought 
(absolutely) at T to do A at T'.
5
 This sort of detachment is sanctioned by (D2) and (D3). And it is 
this sort of detachment which is operative in an important variation of the case just given. 
Suppose that Jones can at T1 either attend a meeting in Los Angeles at T4 , or attend a meeting in 
Chicago at T4, but not both, and that, in order to do the first, he must catch a plane at T2, while, 
in order to do the second, he must catch a plane at T3. Suppose also that he ought (absolutely) at 
T1 to attend the meeting in Los Angeles at T4, but also that he ought at T1 to attend the meeting 
in Chicago at T4 if he does not attend the meeting in Los Angeles at T4. Suppose, finally, that 
Jones, out of sheer will not attend the meeting in Los Angeles at T4. While we still cannot infer 
that Jones ought at T1 to attend the meeting in Chicago at T4, we can say that, once his taking the 
plane at T2 to Los Angeles is no longer open to him, he ought to attend the meeting in Chicago. 
That is, we can say that Jones ought at (or just after) T2 to attend the meeting in Chicago at T4. 
 
Are there other restricted forms of detachment that are warranted? One recent suggestion 
amounts to this: if S ought at T to do A at T' on the condition that p is true, and if p is true, and if 
it is not the case that S ought (absolutely) at T so to act that p is false, then S ought (absolutely) 
at T to do A at T'.
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 While this proposal correctly blocks, for example, the inference in the first 
case that Smith ought at T1 to attend the meeting on the second floor at T2 (for Smith ought at T1 
so to act that it is false that he does not attend the meeting on the first floor at T2), it is 
nonetheless defective. Consider this case. White ought at T1 to thank his host at T3, if he goes to 
the party at T2; it is not the case that White ought at T1 to go to the party at T2; it is not the case 
that White ought at T1 not to go to the party at T2; and White will go to the party at T2. It is clear 
that it is not true to say that White ought at T1 to thank his host at T3, and yet according to the 
proposal this is true. 
 
Part II 
I am sceptical of the success of any attempt to come up with an interesting restricted detachment 
rule, other than that provided by Feldman and Greenspan, where the sort of obligation to be 
detached is that analyzed in (D2).
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 Yet I believe that there is good reason to think that the 
detachment of some sort of obligation is warranted under conditions other than those noted by 
Feldman and Greenspan. I propose to call the sort of obligation at issue here subsidiary absolute 
obligation, and I shall now give an account of when such an obligation may be detached from a 
conditional obligation. 
 
The phenomenon that I have in mind has been noted by others. In particular, McKinsey has 
attempted to account for it. He has talked of "levels of (absolute) obligation" and said that 
absolute obligations may be primary, secondary, tertiary, or indeed n-ary (where n> 1). 
McKinsey is concerned with just that sort of case concerning meetings given earlier, and in those 
cases he wants to say: Smith ought1 at T1 to attend the meeting on the first floor at T2; given that 
Smith does not attend the meeting on the first floor at T2, he ought2 at T1 to attend the meeting on 
the second floor at T2; Jones ought1 at T1 to attend the meeting in Los Angeles at T4; and, given 
that Jones does not attend the meeting in Los Angeles at T4, he ought2 at T1 to attend the meeting 
in Chicago at T4. Here "ought'" expresses a primary obligation and "ought2" a secondary 
obligation. Concerning such levels of obligation, McKinsey says: 
 
By saying that an obligation is secondary (or tertiary, or nary, where n > 1), I do not mean 
that it is any less of an obligation than a primary one. In my view it is just as incumbent upon 
a person to fulfill his secondary obligations, as it is incumbent upon him to fulfill his primary 
ones. For notice that if a person does not do his best, we will blame him also for not doing his 
second best, just as we blame him for not doing his best.
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This is both puzzling and promising. It is puzzling, in that it is not at all clear what it means to 
say that a non-primary obligation is "just as incumbent" as a primary one. Such talk seems to 
afford the sort of easy excuse which it was earlier said should be ruled out. But McKinsey's 
proposal is nevertheless promising. For he has latched on to an important fact, and that is that, if 
one fails to do what one ought to do but does what is "second best", one does less wrong than if 
one also fails to do what is "second best"; and one who fails to do what is "third best" does still 
more wrong; and so on. Smith does wrong if he fails to attend the meeting on the first floor; but 
he does more wrong still if he also fails to attend the meeting on the second floor —and this 
despite the fact that (as we have seen) it is never the case that he ought (in the sense of (D2)) to 
attend the meeting on the second floor. It should also be noted, however, that if Smith attends the 
meeting on the first floor, he does no wrong — he violates no obligation — in not attending the 
meeting on the second floor. 
 
We have noted that, if Smith fails to attend both meetings, he does a double wrong, even though 
he violates only a single obligation (in the sense of (D2)). And this is clearly connected with the 
fact that he has a conditional obligation to attend the meeting on the second floor if he fails to 
attend the meeting on the first floor. I propose that we say that Smith violates a primary absolute 
obligation to attend the meeting on the first floor and a secondary absolute obligation to attend 
the meeting on the second floor. (D2) captures only the concept of primary obligation; we need 
an account of non-primary, that is, subsidiary obligation. 
 
Just how this account should run depends upon what assumption one makes concerning the 
relative values of worlds. In this context, the simplest assumption that one can make in this 
regard is the following: all worlds accessible to S from W at T have a determinate value and at 
least one of these worlds is such that no other of these worlds is more valuable than it. On this 
assumption — which I shall call the Simple Assumption — we may say, therefore, that some 
world (or worlds) accessible to S from W at T has (or have) value-rank 1 (relative to S from W at 
T) and all other worlds accessible to S from W at T have a corresponding subordinate value-rank 
n (where n is some positive integer). 
 
Working with this assumption, I propose the following account of primary, conditional, and 
subsidiary obligation. First: 
 
(D4) S ought1 at T to do A at T' in W =df. [the same definiens as in (D2), with this addition: 
(d) W' has value-rank 1.]
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Next: 
 
(D5) S ought, at T to do A at T' in W, on the condition that p is true =df. [the same definiens 
as in (D3), with this addition: (d) W' has value-rank n.] 
 
And, finally, I propose that we say that, where n > 1, S oughtn to do A just in case, for some 
condition p, he oughtn to do it if p is true, and p is true. That is (where n > 1): 
 
(D6) S ought, at T to do A at T' in W =df. there is a proposition p such that: 
(1) S ought, at T to do A at T' in W, on the condition that p is true; and 
(2) p is true in W.
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Given (D6), we may now say: an obligation to do A on the condition that p is true, combined 
with the fact that p is true, does yield an absolute obligation to do A when and only when the 
conditional and absolute obligations in question are of the same level. We may also say that, 
when a subsidiary obligation is violated, a subsidiary wrong is done. It is this that allows us to 
say that Smith, in failing to attend both meetings, does a double wrong; for he does a primary 
wrong and also a secondary wrong. And it is clear that other situations provide the opportunity 
for doing more than just a double wrong, that is, the opportunity to pile subsidiary wrong upon 
subsidiary wrong ad indefinitum. (D6) is, I believe, adequate to this fact. But (D6) also rules out 
ascribing a secondary wrong to Smith when he fails to attend the meeting on the second floor but 
does attend the meeting on the first floor. There is no detachment of even a subsidiary absolute 
obligation in such a case as that. 
 
But the Simple Assumption may, I suppose, be false; at least, its falsity cannot be ruled out in the 
absence of a fuller account of just what sort of value it is that is at stake.
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 Such falsity may be 
due to one of two factors: either (i) some accessible world lacks a determinate value; or (ii) no 
accessible world has a maximal value. 
 
If case (i) were to arise, I am not sure what we should say. We could choose simply to ignore 
those accessible worlds with indeterminate value by, first, ranking all those with a determinate 
value (assuming that at least one of these has a maximal value) and, second, amending clause (c) 
of (D4) and (D5) as follows: "for all worlds W" such that W" has a determinate value and is 
accessible...". Or we could accept that, sometimes, the existence of accessible worlds of 
indeterminate value undermines certain judgments of obligation. For instance, if some accessible 
world in which S does not do A at T' lacks a determinate value, then, even if all such accessible 
worlds which have a determinate value are less valuable than some accessible world in which S 
does A at Ts, according to (D4) (unamended)
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 it is not the case that S ought, to do A at T' in W, 
while according to (D4) (amended) it is the case that S ought, at T to do A at T' in W. Which 
definition should we accept? This is unclear to me, although I think that we should say at least 
this: if the amendment to (D4) and (D5) just cited is to be rejected, still some method of ranking 
accessible worlds is called for; for sometimes those accessible worlds which lack a determinate 
value will surely be immaterial to certain judgments of obligation (as happens, for example, 
when some accessible world in which S does A at T' lacks a determinate value but also some 
accessible world in which S does A at T' has a determinate value and is, moreover, more 
valuable than any accessible world in which S does not do A at T'). 
 
If case (ii) were to arise (which might happen if the number of worlds accessible to S from W at 
T were infinite), then all judgments of subsidiary obligation would be effectively undermined. 
We could still stick with (D2) and (D3), but any attempt to ascribe a determinate level to a less-
than-primary obligation would be otiose. Even if some accessible p-world in which S does A at 
T' is more valuable than any accessible p-world in which S does not do A at T', still, if some 
accessible non-p-world is even more valuable, then, in actualizing a p-world, S will have done 
infinite wrong. It is true that we could still talk of relative subsidiary obligation and wrongdoing, 
in that we could arbitrarily assign the value-rank of 1 to some accessible non-p-world, then rank 
the topmost accessible p-world accordingly, and then, utilizing (D5) and (D6), obtain a relative 
ranking of subsidiary obligations; but just what the point of this would be, I am not sure. 
 
Part III 
It is instructive, finally, to compare (D6) with the only other attempt in the literature, of which I 
am aware, to account for levels of absolute obligation. This is, of course, McKinsey's attempt, an 
attempt which is explicitly predicated on the Simple Assumption.
13
 His account of levels of 
obligation is at odds with my definition (D6) both with respect to what counts as a subsidiary 
obligation and with respect to what does not.
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It is helpful to "chart" worlds and their value-ranks. In the case of Smith and the meetings on the 
first and second floors, let us put matters this way: 
 
1: (W1 ) A, —B, ... 
2: (W2) —A, B, … 
 
Here, there is one and only one world — namely, W1 — which is accessible to Smith at T1 and 
which has value-rank 1; in W1, Smith's going to the meeting on the first floor at T2 (this is act A) 
does take place, but his going to the meeting on the second floor at T2 (this is act B) does not 
take place. Also, there is one and only one world — namely, W2 — which is accessible to Smith 
at T1 and which has value-rank 2; here A does not take place but B does. We may also assume 
that there are worlds (of a lower rank) accessible to Smith at T1 in which neither A nor B takes 
place (although there are of course no worlds accessible to him then in which both take place). 
Given this information, and given (D4) and (D5), we may say the following: Smith ought2 at T1 
to go to the meeting on the first floor at T2; and Smith ought2 at T1 to go to the meeting on the 
second floor at T2, if he does not go to the meeting on the first floor at T2. Note also that (D4) 
warrants our saying that Smith ought1 at T1 not to go to the meeting on the second floor at T2. 
But note that (D5) does not warrant our saying that Smith ought2 at T1 not to go to the meeting 
on the first floor at T2, if he does go to the meeting on the second floor at T2. (For, again, there is 
no world accessible to Smith at T1 in which both A and B take place.) This would be a bizarre 
thing to say. And so, given (D6), we cannot say, even if Smith goes to the meeting on the second 
floor at T2 (as would be the case if W2 or some — but not just any —world of a lower rank were 
actual), that he ought2 at T1 not to go to the meeting on the first floor at T2. But McKinsey's 
account of levels of obligation sanctions our saying just this.
15
 Thus McKinsey's account is more 
liberal than mine. 
 
His account is also more conservative. Consider this case: 
 
1:  (W1) A, B, … 
2:  (W2) A, —B, … 
(W3) —A, B, … 
3: (W4) —A, —B, …  
 
Here, W1 is the only world of value-rank 1, W2 and W3 are the only worlds of value-rank 2, and 
W4 is the only world of value-rank 3. Let us understand A to be the action of Smith's raising his 
right hand at T2 and B the action of his raising his left hand at T2. Then (D4) and (D5) warrant 
our saying all of the following: Smith ought1 at T1 to raise his right hand at T2; Smith ought1 at 
T1 to raise his left hand at T2; Smith ought2 at T1 to raise his right hand at T2 , if he does not raise 
his left hand then; and Smith ought2 at T1 to raise his left hand at T2, if he does not raise his right 
hand then. In short, it is best for him to raise both hands, but raising just one is preferable to 
raising none (although which one is a matter of indifference). Then, given (D6), if Smith fails to 
raise his left hand at T2 (as in W2 or W4), we may say that Smith ought2 at T1 to raise his right 
hand at T2; and, if Smith fails to raise his right hand at T2 (as in W3 or W4), we may say that 
Smith ought2 at T1 to raise his left hand at T2. (Thus, if W4 is the actual world, Smith is seen, and 
properly so, to have done wrongs on two levels.) But McKinsey's account of levels of obligation 
allows us to say neither of these things.
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It is noteworthy that McKinsey seems not to be especially concerned with conditional obligation 
and detachment when giving his account of levels of obligation.
17
 Perhaps it is this lack of 
concern that has led him astray. At any rate, I think it quite unlikely that subsidiary obligation 
can be satisfactorily accounted for without tying it in explicitly with the issue of conditional 
obligation and detachment. And I also think it quite unlikely that the latter issue can be 
satisfactorily treated without explicitly raising the issue of subsidiary obligation. For the two 
issues are intimately related, as I have tried to show.
18
 
 
NOTES 
1. See [5] for an attempt at an analysis of this sort and [8] for a commentary on this attempt. 
2. [6], p. 393. 
3. [1], pp. 257, 264. I think (D2) has these advantages over Feldman's analysis: it does not 
imply that all past occurrences and all necessary truths are obligatory, and it does not 
require that the value at issue be intrinsic value. (On the latter point: it seems to me a 
purely formal point that the notion of "ought (absolutely)" involves the sort of 
comparison of values stipulated in (D2), but a substantive ethical issue as to just what sort 
of values are being so compared. Compare McKinsey's principle (R) and his commentary 
on it in [6], p. 385.) Whether or not Feldman's use of "accessible" matches mine, I am not 
sure. 
4. See [7], p. 3. 
5. [1], pp. 265-6; [3],p. 265. 
6. See [7], pp. 8-9. 
7. Of course, there are some uninteresting ones available. Here is one: if S ought at T to do 
A at T. on the condition that he does B at T", and if S ought at T to do B at T", then S 
ought at T to do A at T'. 
8. [6], p. 391. 
9. Given the Simple Assumption, clause (d) is strictly redundant; for every accessible world 
in which S does not do A at T' is, according to clause (c), less than maximally valuable. 
But I include clause (d) for the sake of perspicuity. 
10. The formulation of this definition is due in part to a suggestion made by David 
Thomasson, for which I am grateful. 
11. See Note 3 above. 
12. Assuming that some suitable interpretation has been given to its clause (d). 
13. See [6], pp. 391-2. In [3], p. 266ff., and [4], p. 81, Greenspan apparently thinks that 
subsidiary obligation is merely conditional obligation. Clearly, it is my view that this is 
mistaken. In [2], p. 211, n. 13, Goldman mentions this issue, but she reserves judgment 
and provides no account of levels of obligation. 
14. I refer to McKinsey's formula (L) on p. 392 of [6]. This formula reads as follows.  
x oughtn at t to do Ai if and only if  
(1) Ai is contained in every Φx, t of rank n; and  
(2) for every Φx, t which has a rank m higher than n (i.e., where m < n), there is an Aj 
such that Φx, t contains Aj and x will not do Aj.  
Here x is an agent, t a time, and Ai and Aj are actions (or, presumably, omissions) done at 
times ti and tj, respectively; and a "Φx, t" is a "life-sequence" of actions open to x at t. 
15. See the last note. 
16. See Note 14 above. In each case, clause (1) of (L) is violated. 
17. He does mention this issue in a footnote 10 ([6], p. 395, n. 10), but it is not a matter that 
occupies his attention in the rest of his paper. 
18. My thanks to John Pollock for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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